The more I peruse the ongoing argle-bargle regarding the Cincinnati Reds’ decision-making with respect to players, managers, coaches, strategy, et cetera, the more I’m convinced fans and interested onlookers are unaware or unwilling to accept the nitty-gritty details that make up this organizational makeover, one that has been in the making for some time. Sure, the general public has been vaguely made aware by use of the words “situational hitting” and the way it has been sold as a Wegovy-like injection of philosophy that will slim down the wasted at bats and create a leaner, meaner lineup for Terry Francona. But does it? And where did all this come from?
On the surface, it began a year ago when the new process started along with the hire of Francona. However, from this outsider’s perspective, it felt like it began with the parting of ways with Driveline founder Kyle Boddy in the fall of 2021 after a short 2-year stint following the departure of Dick Williams. Williams believed in the Driveline approach and Boddy in particular, but the front office tandem of Nick Krall/Brad Meador did not, apparently. Other coordinator departures followed, as Krall & Co. began the task of moving in a fundamentally different direction.
With the firing of the analytic-friendly David Bell and the subsequent hiring of Francona, the front office signaled a return to what Charlie Goldsmith has referred to in his reporting as a more “holistic” approach to the game, an approach that showed itself in real time against the Pittsburgh Pirates, when the manager failed to lift TJ Friedl in the 8th inning, leaving Dane Myers on the bench in what many saw as an obvious pinch-hitting situation.
As Goldsmith has reported, at the beginning of the Tito Tenure, Krall and Meador were committed to changing the hitting approach throughout the organization, mimicking the top-down unified strategy headed by Derek Johnson on the pitching side. Just as there were too many differing philosophies in development on the mound at various levels of the organization, it was decided the same issue existed on the hitting side. Accordingly, just as Johnson drives the decision-making within his own purview to considerable success, so was Chris Valaika chosen to direct how hitters are selected, taught, triaged, and developed up and down the organization. Those screaming for the firing of Valaika are likely wasting their time. This development strategy is still very much in its youth, and a decision to reverse course on such a broad scale would surely create internal chaos, not to mention conflict with Francona, who strongly believes in Valaika and his baseball acumen.
A close examination of the pedigreed resumes of the staff reveals a group Francona values from his days with Boston and Cleveland. Reds farm director Jeremy Farrell worked for the Red Sox during the Theo Epstein era, and worked closely with Valaika when both were with the Chicago Cubs, again with Epstein. And, of course Valaika was Francona’s hitting coach with the Indians.
Everything the Reds are doing on the hitting side seems to be in line with a hitting philosophy Francona either believes in or has adopted by necessity. More bunting; less emphasis on power and an unwillingness to accept the strikeouts that go along with that approach. Less analytics and more of what Francona and the front office refer to as “The Art of Hitting.”
The difficulty with this approach is it comes a cropper when faced with guys on the mound throwing sliders, sweepers, and cutters at ever increasing speed. Velocity, coupled with a dramatic increase in horizontal and vertical break have made the old school art of taking a pitch the other way a much more difficult task, which is why major league hitters across baseball continue to pull the ball in the air, choosing power over contact. As Detroit Tigers manager A.J. Hinch said in a recent Athletic piece, “Even though we changed the shift in the infield, we didn’t change that the optimal ball in play is the ball in the air.”
With the shift outlawed and fielders forced to play with their feet in the dirt, short line drives find more terra firma in front of outfielders, which is yet another reason the Reds may want Ke’Bryan Hayes, Elly De La Cruz and Matt McLain maximizing the coverage the shift no longer provides. Moreover, the wide open spaces on one side of the diamond the shift once attempted to entice hitters to slap the ball toward are largely gone.
The front office knows the turning of this aircraft carrier and its philosophy away from a dominant sports science approach to a “hit tool” focus is a slow one that will take time just as it did on the pitching side. It may partially explain why Francona has stuck with Friedl, McLain and the rest of the struggling offense, giving them a longer leash as the organizational approach changes. What we know is that like Dusty Baker, Francona is very loyal to his guys, and believes buttressing his players’ confidence is best for them individually and for clubhouse harmony as a whole.
It also possibly explains why the Reds are slow to promote players who have recently excelled at the plate at Louisville. It’s not merely that the gap between the pitching at AAA and the big leagues is a significant gulf, but may also be a reason to slow promotions as they turn to the task of teaching these inchoate athletes those situational skills they haven’t focused on before—e.g., bunting, the hit-and-run—making choices that Valaika refers to as “playing to the scoreboard.” As a preemptive comment, those that insist bunting fundamentals are little league skills, should be cautioned against comparing the skills needed to sacrifice bunt against 12-year old arms with the velocity and movement of the likes of Paul Skenes.
Opinions like the above illustrate just how out of touch many are with the decision-making that has been predetermined courtesy of a budget set down by ownership, a budget only extended when Krall went to the Castellinis and pleaded for an additional $15M to sign Eugenio Suárez, whose free agent value had plummeted. Trading pitching for a middle of the lineup slugger over the winter was never in the cards, even if one foolishly believes the Reds had plenty of arms, even before the setbacks to Hunter Greene, Nick Lodolo, Rhett Lowder, Brandon Williamson and now possibly Brady Singer.
There’s little question who will be blamed if this new approach on the offensive side of the ball fails. It’s a broken record at this point that has long been a fait accompli with many, and perhaps even warranted. However, I’m going to channel my inner Todd Rundgren and bang the drum all day blaming ownership for the bind this front office and manager have been subjected to.
If you have to covet your prospects to the extent that you cannot use them to improve the team because they are the sole source of your success (now and in the future) and lack the funds to bolster the team with difference-makers—power hitters and top-of-the-rotation starting pitchers—the margin for error is too small for the people that have to build a winning lineup and maintain it over 162 games, much less multiple seasons.
If the nerds have been relegated to the children’s table at dinnertime and the old school grownups are left to pursue their Art of Hitting philosophy, they’d better get it right or the Cincinnati Reds are headed for another decade in the dungeon of the National League Central.