Every three years, the IPL resets. The losers get to rebuild, the winners get to strengthen, elite stars and promising rookies get big deals, and the fans get to have endless debates about the pros and cons of each team.
But, for every Mega Auction, there are two Mini Auction off-seasons that don’t offer those limitless dreams. New player purchases are largely unknown quantities or rejects that rarely move the needle.
Within that context, it is interesting to see what the mid-to-lower table sides from 2025 have tried to change to become more competitive. Getting new players is step one, but how you utilise them can make or break your season.
Through the first 10 days of the 2026 IPL, I’ve noticed quite a few teams who have tried new tactical choices with varying degrees of success. Some – like RCB’s use of Jacob Duffy to replace Josh Hazlewood – have been obvious and sufficiently analysed. Others have gone under the radar.
In today’s column – kickstarting a regular series for the rest of the IPL – I wanted to look at four tactical choices that caught my eye in the first week of the tournament.
Jump to a section;
The Rajasthan Royals’ 2025 season was marred by their inability to finish easy chases. Shimron Hetmyer, Dhruv Jurel, and Shubham Dubey found themselves in situations where the Royals needed 12 runs off 9 balls, 9 runs off 6 balls, 18 runs off 12 balls, and 3 runs off 1 ball, and yet RR somehow lost all four games.
Meanwhile, they also struggled with the ball. RR were one of two teams with an economy rate above 10, and they ranked second-last in the middle overs (9.58) and last in the death overs (12.71). Their only bowler with an economy below 9 in 2025? Riyan Parag. No wonder they lost 10 games.
The franchise has chosen to focus on their bowling in the offseason, with just the Nitish Rana-Donovan Ferreira trade made to improve their finishing. Instead, they overhauled the bowling lineup they bought in the 2025 Mega Auction, releasing Wanindu Hasaranga (5.25 Crore), Mahesh Theekshana (4.4 Cr), Fazalhaq Farooqi (2 Cr), and Akash Madhwal (1.2 Cr).
Meanwhile, the Sanju Samson trade netted them Ravindra Jadeja and Sam Curran, who would ideally add first XII all-rounder talent to their bowling unit. Finally, RR’s most expensive Mini Auction buys included local boy Ravi Bishnoi and Adam Milne, who are both useful options with the ball.
With Sam Curran’s injury, RR went into the new season with six frontline bowling options in their starting XII – Jofra Archer, N’Andre Burger, Ravi Bishnoi, Ravindra Jadeja, Sandeep Sharma, and one of Brijesh Sharma or Tushar Deshpande.
Two games in, and RR’s strategy has worked as well as the team could’ve hoped.
Burger and Archer made the most of the overcast conditions and the seam movement in Game 1 v CSK, reducing the visitors to 19/3 in 3.1 overs. Ravindra Jadeja varied his pace well to dismiss the potentially dangerous pair of Sarfaraz Khan and Shivam Dube. All six frontline bowling options took wickets as the Royals restricted the Super Kings to just 127, which was chased with ease.
On the batting-friendly surface in Ahmedabad in Game 2, their new bowling lineup was tasked with defending 210 runs. They got off to a rough start, with GT putting up 107/1 in 10.3 overs. But, their bowlers fought back effectively. Bishnoi took four wickets, running through GT’s middle and lower order after having the in-form Sai Sudharsan caught in the deep.
Burger’s bouncer dismissed the ominous Jos Buttler, while Archer and Deshpande nailed their death bowling plans to defend 15 runs off 12 balls to maintain RR’s perfect record. The extra bowling options were key to the GT win, as they could afford to let Jadeja & Sharma sit out their final overs after it was clear it wasn’t to be their night.
In another change they made to fix their batting order troubles, Dhruv Jurel was promoted up the order to No.3 after his disappointing death overs cameos last year. He started slow against GT – scoring 11 of his first 12 balls – but ended up with a vital 42-ball 75-run innings. Giving the wicketkeeper more time to get settled has paid dividends so far this campaign.
Their current XII has done a good job of accentuating their strengths. Their top 5 batters can take over any game on their own, especially with Vaibhav Suryavanshi taking a big leap in his sophomore season. Meanwhile, their revamped, flexible bowling unit has already started to pay dividends – even without Sam Curran in the lineup.
However, they have made a major compromise in an important position. In the Impact Player era where the No. 7 position is best reserved for a big-hitter, RR have…Jadeja. Of the 26 batters to have faced more than 100 balls at the death since 2023, Jadeja ranks 24th in strike rate, striking at 162.71 in the last four overs. Walking in at the 17th over, Jadeja’s contribution of 7 runs off 7 balls against GT drove home his limitations as a quick hitter.
RR are not the complete side yet, but they’ve already achieved half as many wins in one week this year (2/2) as they did throughout the entire 2025 season (4/14). It’s one of the most impressively ambitious off-season strategies we’ve seen in IPL history, and so far it’s working out well.
🩷🩷🩷🩷🩷
Some eyebrows were raised when Rishabh Pant walked out with Mitchell Marsh to open the batting for the Lucknow Super Giants against the Delhi Capitals. Marsh and Aiden Markram had scored the second-most runs among IPL opening partnerships last year, as both players enjoyed career-best seasons.
However, the answer to Pant’s batting position is a larger issue for LSG as a whole. After becoming the most expensive player in IPL Auction history, Pant endured a tough first season for his new side last year. In particular, he’s struggled against spin since returning from injury. He struck at 166.3 v pace and 117.9 v spin in the 2024 and 2025 IPL seasons. Playing at No. 4 last season, he faced a lot of spin, especially early in his innings – except for one game v RCB where he played at No. 3 and scored an unbeaten century.
The gamble is clear though – moving Pant up means not only breaking up a successful partnership, but also demoting Nicholas Pooran. The West Indian had scored 466 runs at an average of 46.6 and a strike rate of 201.7 at No. 3 last season. The assumption LSG probably made? Pooran would be fine in the middle order, considering his astounding strike rate of 263.5 against spin.
In LSG’s first game v DC, there was some real merit to breaking up the opening pair beyond Pant’s needs. Neither Marsh (123 SR in 2025) nor Markram (135 SR) are quick-scorers of left-arm spin in the powerplay. Against DC’s Axar Patel, both struggle; Marsh scores at just 117.9 SR in all T20s, while Markram has been dismissed thrice while scoring at just 111.8 SR.
By switching up their top order, they managed to keep Patel away for the first few overs – but Pant’s unlucky run out in third over brought Markram to the crease. Before the powerplay was over, Patel bowled Markram. Not a lot to learn.
Markram was back to his usual opening spot with Marsh for Game 2 v SRH. Which meant that Harsh Dubey, SRH’s SLA, got a run in the powerplay where LSG could only score 10 runs in his first two overs. However, they successfully attacked the pacers to make up for it; Markram scored 30 runs off just 13 pace balls in the powerplay, and his game-long SR of 166.66 was the highest in a second innings where LSG only had to chase 157.
In the same game, it looked like Pant found some form too at No.3. His innings of 68* (50) won the game on a tricky track, but it was far from convincing. The southpaw could’ve been caught multiple times and looked stuck deep into his innings, but ultimately got the job done with a 12-run final over.
Meanwhile, Pooran’s middle-order return is not going well. Theoretically, it’s not a problem as he’s thrived in a similar role for LSG in 2023-24, scoring 857 runs at an average of 42.9 and a strike rate above 175. However, this season, he’s only scored 9 runs in 12 balls across 2 innings.
Pooran’s struggles this season could be an anomaly, or it could be LSG creating a second problem in a bid to fix their first. One quick fix is bringing Pooran back to No. 4 – he’s been playing at No. 5 with Ayush Badoni between the top order and the West Indian.
Badoni’s entry points in both games – the end of the 6th and the start of the 9th – correspond with Pooran’s ideal entry points from last season. The de-stabilised top order could have Pooran playing his ideal position anyway, but Badoni’s promotion has thrown a wrench in the works.
LSG is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Last season’s top order was suboptimal for Pant, and while this season’s batting order is theoretically better, it is yet to get a notable performance from their best batter of 2025.
🩵🩵🩵🩶🩶
The Mumbai Indians have held back Jasprit Bumrah’s usage at the top of the innings in recent times. Since the 2025 season, Bumrah has bowled less than 42% of his overs in the first half of the innings, most notably giving up the new ball to the likes of Trent Boult, Deepak Chahar, and Hardik Pandya.
This has meant that Bumrah has been used largely as a firefighter in the last two phases of the game. An over in the powerplay as and when needed, an over in the middle overs as and when needed. He rarely picks up a second over in a row, until the death.
It’s a strategy MI used last year as well, as Bumrah bowled 20 isolated overs in the first two phases, compared to just 11 consecutive overs (the numbers are much closer at the death, where he’s 9 consecutive overs, and 8 isolated overs).
This season has seen a continuation of this tactical choice through their early games.
In MI’s first game of the season, they let KKR run away to 57/0 in the first 4 overs before bringing on Jasprit Bumrah. While they had theoretically used a series of powerplay specialists – Trent Boult, Allah Ghazanfar, and Hardik Pandya – it was far from ideal to let the opposition build up a head of steam when you’ve got a cheat code like Bumrah in your squad.
Bowling the fifth over on an absolute belter, Bumrah conceded two boundaries in his first over, and would not be given another over until the 12th. MI had clearly opted to use him as a way to strangle opposition batters in the late-middle and death overs, and he delivered by conceding just 24 in his last 3 overs versus KKR.
MI chased down their 220-run target in the game, so you could argue the strategy worked. And yet, there are doubts over whether conceding 220 runs to KKR is a good bowling result.
However, a Game 2 versus the dangerous Delhi Capitals would be a much stiffer test. Despite knocking DC down to 7/2 in a 163-run chase, Sameer Rizvi would win them the game with a brilliant knock of 90 runs.
Rizvi scored 10 runs off his first 16 balls before smashing 80 off his next 35. Of those first 16 balls, 9 balls had come against Mitchell Santner and Bumrah. In the 7th over against Santner, especially, Rizvi had looked extremely uncomfortable. The Kiwi drew 4 false shots in the 5 balls against Rizvi, with the batter unable to adjust to Santner’s trajectory off the pitch.
With MI going to their 5th and 6th bowling options soon after, Rizvi began an onslaught against Corbin Bosch & Mayank Markande as the Capitals added 53 runs off four overs between the 9th and 12th over.
Bumrah was brought back in the 13th over and conceded just one run. Bumrah had given MI some momentum, and they could make things interesting if they could dismiss Rizvi within this run drought…and yet MI went to Deepak Chahar and Shardul Thakur, who would concede 30 runs in two overs. In a bid to save Santner’s and Bumrah’s last overs, MI lost the game before the death overs even began.
There is an inherent risk to holding back your best bowlers for the death overs; you could be out of the game by the time that phase of the game comes around. Most teams mitigate that risk by also giving their best bowlers a couple of powerplay options. However, MI have sacrificed that advantage to potentially use Bumrah in the middle overs occasionally.
Holding back Bumrah can be a double-edged sword; it allows MI to get out of some of the toughest overs in an innings without much damage, but it also minimises the possibility for him to thrive in favorable contexts. Everyone knows Bumrah is a danger man. His wicket tally doesn’t reflect his output because batters tend to bat him out if possible. When you give him one-off overs at different points of the game – combined with pressure release bowlers on the other end – it makes life easier for the opposition.
For context, in 2025, Bumrah bowled 28 isolated overs and 20 consecutive overs across all phases. His bowling SR in isolated overs was 23.86, while his bowling SR in consecutive overs was 11.09. By choosing to split his overs up across multiple phases – thereby making him a firefighter rather than a primary threat – MI are potentially misusing a generational bowler for damage control.
Extending this approach to their second-best bowler in their recent game saw them effectively lose a game before the full quotas of their best bowlers were complete.
💙💙🩶🩶🩶
During the 2026 Mini Auction, CSK brought in four new overseas players; Matt Henry, Zak Foulkes, Matt Short, and Akeal Hosein. Yet, by their second game of the season against PBKS, the team was using just 2 overseas players in their starting XII, deciding that their 9th and 10th best local players were more viable options.
This move is partly explained by their injuries, with young star Dewald Brevis out for the start of the season, and Nathan Ellis out for the entire tournament. But CSK’s decision to replace the latter with Spencer Johnson – yet another injured powerplay bowler – makes no sense. CSK will probably be eliminated by the time he’s fit.
Meanwhile, they’ve brought in Matt Short – an opener – to replace Brevis, the middle-overs, spin-hitting dynamo. CSK already have an overload of openers in Ruturaj Gaikwad, Sanju Samson, and Ayush Mhatre – all of whom are already guaranteed a starting XII spot.
To further complicate matters, Short is significantly better against pace since 2023 (162.9 SR) than spin (130.1 SR, and 4 dismissals in 21 balls during his last IPL stint). Dropping him down the order is asking for trouble.
The Short experiment was doomed to failure, and so it proved. He played at No. 4 in CSK’s first game v RR, where he lasted just seven balls before tamely chipping a shot to midwicket. This despite coming in during the powerplay and facing only pace. He was promptly dropped for their second game against PBKS.
This lack of trust in their OS players extends beyond Short though. Despite starting just two foreign players in their XI versus PBKS, they chose Rahul Chahar as their impact player. He was promptly hit for 46 runs in his 4 overs.
Jamie Overton made a return to the side against RCB in Game 3, but CSK had still chosen less than their full quota of OS players in the starting XI for the third game in a row. Ironically, while Overton’s death bowling played into Tim David’s hands, he did prove himself a decent late order bat. His 37 (16) against RCB was the second promising display this season, after top scoring for CSK with 43* against RR in Game 1.
CSK’s unconventional overseas combination is not purely down to overwhelming local quality; it’s down to the lack of trust in their own recruitment. Akeal Hosein is yet to feature even in the substitutes for one of CSK’s games, despite the fact that a fairly impotent CSK bowling unit (economy of 10.8 RPO in 3 games) hasn’t tried an over of left-arm orthodox spin in two games.
This is particularly notable because their current selection choices are leaving them unbalanced on both the batting and bowling front. The opener-heavy top order has already been discussed, but with the current bowling combinations they are going into games expecting the likes of Overton, Dube & 20-year old Prashant Veer (who hasn’t bowled yet) to make an impact.
Very few teams in IPL history have made a less-than-four-overseas player strategy work, and CSK does not have the local core to do this. Dewald Brevis’ imminent return in the next game should likely give CSK an overseas quartet, but the lack of trust in their own recruits has been notable through the first three games of the season.
💛🩶🩶🩶🩶